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Abstract
Quantum copy-protection is an innovative idea that uses the no-cloning property of quantum
information to copy-protect programs and was first put forward by [Aar09]. The general goal
is that a program distributor can distribute a quantum state |Ψ〉, whose classical description is
secret to the users; a user can use this state to run the program P on his own input, but not be
able to pirate this program P or create another state with the same functionality.
In the copy-protection with oracle setting, the user has access to a public oracle and can use
the given quantum state and the oracle to compute on his/her own input for polynomially many
times. However, the user is not able to produce an additional program (quantum or classical)
that computes the same as P on almost all inputs.
We present a first quantum copy protection scheme with a classical oracle for any unlearnable
function families. The construction is based on membership oracles for hidden subspaces in Fn
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an idea derived from the public key quantum money scheme in [AC12]. We prove the security
of the scheme relative to a classical oracle, namely, the subspace membership oracle with the
functionality of computing the secret function we want to copy-protect. The security proof builds
on the quantum lower bound for the Direct-Product problem ([AC12, BDS16]) and the quantum
unlearnability of the copy-protected functions. We can show that any adversary, in order to
break anti-piracy, must have implicitly done one of the following two things: prepare another
state that has almost the same functionality, breaking the lower bound for the Direct-Product
problem; or learn the input-output behavior of the copy-protected function.
We also show that the existence of quantum copy protection and the quantum hardness of
Learning-with-Errors (LWE) will imply publicly verifiable quantum money. In the end, we point
out possible directions to instantiate quantum copy protection from cryptographic primitives.
1 Introduction
Quantum copy-protection was proposed by Aaronson in [Aar09]. Similar to the more widely-
studied quantum money, quantum copy-protection is also inspired by the No-Cloning property
of quantum information, but it aims at a different security goal: for quantum money, we need
verifiable, unclonable quantum states; for quantum copy-protection, we want some unclonable
states that can also let us compute certain functions correctly.
The informal definition for quantum copy protection is as follows: given a secret function
f : X → Y drawn from a publicly known function family F , we want a quantum state |Ψf 〉 that
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(1) can be efficiently prepared given a classical description of f ; (2) can be used to compute f(x)
efficiently and correctly for (almost) all inputs x ∈ X ; (3) cannot be used to prepare more states ρ
and more functions f ′ efficiently so that f ′ and ρ can compute f correctly almost anywhere.
The idea of quantum money was first introduced by Wiesner [Wie83] in around 1970. A secure
quantum money should have the following properties (assuming all parties have access to some
quantum resources): an efficient algorithm to prepare the quantum money state; an efficient quan-
tum algorithm to verify the money produced by the bank with high probability; no one (except the
bank) can efficiently duplicate the states accepted by the verifier except with exponentially small
probability. In a secure public-key/publicly verifiable quantum money scheme, the verification part
is public, i.e. anyone can verify the money efficiently.
Among the public-key quantum money schemes proposed till today, Aaronson and Christiano
[AC12] constructed a simple and beautiful scheme relative to a classical oracle, namely the subspace
membership oracle: the oracle has a secretly, randomly chosen n/2-dimensional subspace A ⊂ Fn2
inside and upon each input vector, it outputs 1 if the vector is in A and non-zero, and outputs 0 oth-
erwise. The oracle setting security of this scheme is proven based on quantum lower bound obtained
through inner-product adversary method; later Zhandry [Zha17] instantiated the subspace mem-
bership oracle with a black-box construction from quantum-secure indistinguishability obfuscation
(iO) and injective one-way functions. Indistinguishability obfuscation is an algorithm that takes
in two circuits C1, C2 with same functionalities and produce two obfuscated circuits O(C1), O(C2)
so that they maintain original computation functionalities, but a probabilistic polynomial-time ad-
versary cannot distinguish between the two obfuscated circuits. [Zha17] assumes a quantum-secure
version of this primitive together with injective one-way functions to construct a subspace-hiding
obfuscator that achieves the subspace-hiding property needed in [AC12] quantum money scheme.
Quantum copy-protection is a less explored idea. By far we don’t have any provably secure
copy-protection scheme of any class of unlearnable functions even when oracles are allowed. By
unlearnable functions, we mean a function family F that is not learnable from its input/output
behavior for any quantum polynomial time (QPT) adversary having only classical black-box access
to the functions. [Aar09] showed that any learnable function families cannot be copy-protected.
[Aar09] also showed that learnability of functions is the only obstruction to quantum copy-protection
relative to a quantum oracle, but did not give a provably secure copy-protection scheme or a specific
quantum oracle to build copy-protection upon. Moreover, the ultimate goal is to design an explicit
and practical copy-protection scheme; therefore, this led us to raise the following open problem:
Can we design a quantum copy-protection scheme relative to classical oracle?
1.1 Main Results
Quantum Copy-Protection Relative to a Classical Oracle Our main contribution resolves
the foregoing open problem with a positive answer. Namely, we present a copy-protection scheme,
suggested by Paul Christiano, based on the same subspace membership oracles in [AC12] and prove
the following theorem, which shows that our scheme is secure against any quantum polynomial-time
adversary for a large class of functions relative to a classical oracle.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For any quantumly unlearnable family of functions F : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m,m = O(poly(n)), we can construct a copy-protection scheme for f ∈ F such that using
a classical oracle:
• Any authorized user can use the program to compute f correctly and efficiently for polynomi-
ally many times.
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• Any quantum polynomial time adversary (whether an authorized user or not) cannot pirate
the copy-protection program of f , except with a negligible probability.
The high-level idea is that the copy-protection scheme requires any authorized user to query
the oracle twice using an “unclonable” state in order to obtain a valid computation result. More
specifically, this unclonable state |A〉 is an equal superposition over some subspace, known only
to the vendor. Upon the first query, the user queries the oracle on the original state |A〉 and its
own input for the function, and receives the function computation result masked with randomness;
on the second query, the user uses the state after applying Quantum Fourier Transform and the
same function input, and it receives the corresponding randomness. The user can then remove the
randomness to obtain the correct computation result. On the other hand, any unauthorized user
almost always gets useless outputs.
The anti-piracy security first relies on the quantum hardness of the Direct-Product problem
in [BDS16]: given the membership oracle for a secret, randomly chosen n/2-dimensional subspace
A ⊂ Fn2 and the membership oracle for its dual subspace A⊥, it is hard for a quantum polynomial-
time adversary to find two non-zero vectors (u, v), u ∈ A, v ∈ A⊥.
Next we prove that any QPT adversaries who have broken the anti-piracy security copy-
protection scheme can be divided into two categories, Type I and Type II. For any Type I ad-
versary, there is a QPT reduction algorithm which can use it to solve the Direct-Product problem,
by extracting information from the produced pirate programs making queries to the oracle. For
any Type II adversary, who does not achieve what the type I adversaries do, a QPT algorithm can
use it to quantumly learn an unlearnable function by having only classical black-box access to the
function. The quantum lower bound for direct-product problem and the unlearnable property of
the copy-protected functions immediately give us the security of the scheme when the adversary
can only access one piece of program., which we call mini-scheme security. Then we generalize
our construction from a mini-scheme to the case when an adversary can access polynomially many
programs for the same function, and prove the security in this case.
We also point out some directions to remove the oracle and implement the scheme with crypto-
graphic primitives; the existence of quantum-secure indistinguishability obfuscation is highly likely
to be necessary but not sufficient.
Relation to Public-key Quantum Money We show that quantum copy-protection for the
decryption function from a quantum CCA secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme implies
public-verifiable quantum money. If we can copy-protect the decryption function (with the secret
key), we can let a quantum copy-protection program be a quantum banknote; then everyone can
use the corresponding public key from the encryption scheme to verify a quantum money state.
Such candidate quantum CCA secure PKE scheme can be built from Learning-with-Errors (LWE).
Similarly, we show that quantum copy-protection for certain quantum-secure injective trapdoor
functions implies public-verifiable quantum money.
1.2 Relevant Works
Quantum Copy-Protection Quantum Copy-Protection was proposed by Aaronson et al in
[Aar09]. and this paper also gave two candidate schemes for copy-protecting point functions without
security proofs. He proved that any functions that are not quantum learnable can be quantumly
copy-protected relative to a quantum oracle, based on Complexity-Theoretic No-Cloning but did
not give a quantum oracle construction.
Broadbent and Lord in [BL19] introduced unclonable encryption. They construct schemes for
encoding classical plaintexts into quantum ciphertexts, which prevents copying of encrypted data.
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Unclonable encryption can be seen as copy-protecting a unit of functional information simpler than
a function.
Quantum Money Quantum money was first proposed by Wiesner [Wie83] in around 1970. His
scheme is based on conjugate coding, consisting of a unique classical serial number and n polarized
photons to determine the quantum state. However, as pointed out by Aaronson et al. [AC12],
his scheme has some drawbacks, including the verifiability problem, the online attack problem
and the giant database problem. After a few decades, Aaronson [Aar09] gave the first public-key
quantum money and quantum copyright protection. He proved that it is possible to construct
the secure public-key quantum money relative to a quantum oracle. However, his explicit scheme
was broken by Lutomirski et al. [LAF+09]. Later, Aaronson and Christiano [AC12] proposed a
secure public-key quantum money scheme relative to a classical oracle; they used hidden subspaces
and quantum-secure digital signature to build the scheme. Its explicit scheme using conjectures
about polynomials was later broken but the oracle version is proven secure through a lower bound
obtained by inner-product adversary method. Zhandry [Zha17] studied the quantum lightning,
a formalization of “collision-free quantum money”. He showed the relation between quantum
money/quantum lightning and the security of signatures/hash functions; [Zha17] also instantiated
the quantum money scheme of Aaronson and Christiano with quantum-secure indistinguishability
obfuscation. More recently, Kane [Kan18] showed a new approach for public-key quantum money
using modular forms. Ji et al. [JLS18] defined the pseudorandom quantum state (PRS), which
is a family of quantum states such that a random member of state among this family cannot be
efficiently distinguished from the state drawn according to the Haar measure. He gave efficient
constructions of PRS’s assuming that quantum-secure one-way functions exist. Using PRS, they
can give a more generic and query secure private-key quantum money scheme.
Another interesting circumstance to consider is classically verifiable quantum money introduced
in [Gav12]. The communication between the bank and the user is classical and verification is
through interactive protocols between them. [RS19] gives a construction for such semi-quantum
money assuming quantum-secure Message Authentication Code (MAC) and Learning-with-Errors
(LWE), taking using of the noisy trapdoor claw-free function introduced by [BCM+18].
Aaronson [Aar18] showed a relation between quantum money and shadow tomography of quan-
tum states. He proved that for any private-key quantum money scheme, a counterfeiter can produce
additional bills with high probability given polynomial-many legitimate bills and exponential time,
without querying to the bank.
One-time Programs and One-time Memory Another idea of copy-protecting softwares is
through one-time program, introduced in [GKR08]. One-time programs can be executed on only
one single input and nothing other than the result of this computation is leaked. One-time memory
is a notion analogous to oblivious transfer but sender destroys the database after the transfer and is
classically unachievable without hardware assumptions. Quantum one-time programs are discussed
in [BGS13], showing that any quantum circuit can be compiled into a one-time program assuming
only the same basic one-time memory devices used for classical circuits.
Obfuscation Obfuscation is a classical cryptographic primitive to hide the computation proce-
dures of functions but maintain their functionalities. The most ideal and strong notion, virtual
black-box obfuscation is proven to be impossible for general circuits/TMs in [BGI+01]. VBB ob-
fuscation constructions nevertheless exist for certain functionalities such as point functions; there
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are also realizations of other weaker VBB notions, for example distributional VBB obfuscation
based on lattice, in [GKW17] and [WZ17].
Indistinguishability obfuscation(iO) was put forward by [BGI+01, BGI+12], as a weaker sub-
stitute to the too strong notion of black-box obfuscation. What iO achieves is making two cir-
cuits with almost identical functionalities to be indistinguishable to the adversary. Garg et. al.
[GGH+16] described a candidate construction for iO for NC1 circuit using multilinear maps. Re-
cently, [AJL+19] gives iO construction from assuming bilinear maps, subexponential hardness of
Learning-with-Errors (LWE), weak PRG and security amplification; the assumptions are further
simplified in [JLS19]. Though difficult to construct from standard assumptions, iO as a black-box
is extremely useful in building other cryptographic primitives, shown in works such as [SW14].
On the quantum side, Alagic and Fefferman [AF16] defined several notions of quantum obfus-
cation and proved several impossibility results.
Watermarking Watermarking is a different way to copy-protect softwares classically by em-
bedding a “watermark” into the softwares’ functionalities; a verification algorithm can verify the
watermark and a watermarked software cannot function properly if the watermark is removed.
[BGI+01] proposed the notion of watermarking and [HMW07] gives more general and rigorous defi-
nitions for watermarking schemes. Later works, such as [CHV15, NW15, KW17, CHN+18, QWZ18]
study more variants of goals such as public-key watermarking, publicly-verifiable watermarking and
different watermarking schemes for cryptographic primitives, such PRFs.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we use F to denote F2 and use S(n) to denote all n/2 dimensional subspaces in F
n.
Definition 2.1 (Dual Subspace). Given a subspace S of a vector space V , let S⊥ be the orthogonal
complement of S: the set of y ∈ V such that x · y = 0 for all x ∈ S. It is not hard to show: S⊥ is
also a subspace of V ; (S⊥)⊥ = S.
2.1 Quantum Information and Query Models
In this work, we consider the quantum query model, which gives quantum circuits access to some
oracles. The classical and quantum oracles are defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Classical Oracle). A classical oracle O on input query x is a unitary transformation
of the form |x〉 → (−1)h(x) |x〉 for function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}.
Definition 2.3 (Quantum Oracle). A quantum oracle is an arbitrary n -qubit unitary transfor-
mation that a quantum algorithm can apply in a black-box way. Given oracle Uf that computes
a function f on input |x〉, we usually write us Uf |x, y, 0〉 → |x, y + f(x), 0〉: the first part is the
quantum system over the set of possible inputs; the second part is the quantum system over a set
of possible outputs; the third is the workspace register and is reset after use.
Note that a classical oracle can be queried in quantum superposition. The main difference
between classical and quantum oracles is that a quantum oracle can answer with a superposition of
computation results. Note that in this paper, when we apply a classical oracle as a multi-bit output
function, we apply it only on classical inputs; when we apply a classical oracle in superposition
on a quantum input, the oracle implements a boolean function, such as the subspace membership
oracle below.
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Definition 2.4 (Subspace Membership Oracles). A subspace membership oracle for a subspace
A ⊂ Fn, denoted as UA, on input vector v, will output 1 if v ∈ A, v 6= 0 and will output 0
otherwise.
The “No Cloning Theorem” states that it’s impossible to clone an unknown arbitrary quantum
state. This impossibility can also be characterized by query complexity, as a generalization of the
No-Cloning Theorem and the BBBV lower bound for quantum search .
Theorem 2.5 (Complexity-Theoretic No-Cloning [AC12]). Given one copy of |ψ〉, as well as oracle
access to Uψ such that Uψ |ψ〉 = − |ψ〉 and Uψ |φ〉 = |φ〉 for all |φ〉 orthogonal to |ψ〉, a counterfeiter
needs Ω(2n/2) queries to prepare |ψ〉⊗2 with certainty (for a worst-case |ψ〉).
In addition, we also use the “Gentle Measurement Lemma” or “Almost As Good As New
Lemma”.
Theorem 2.6 (Gentle Measurement Lemma [Aar04]). Suppose a measurement on a mixed state ρ
yields a particular outcome with probability 1 − ǫ. Then after the measurement, one can recover a
state ρ˜ such that ‖ρ˜− ρ‖ ≤ √ǫ.
2.2 Cryptography
Definition 2.7 (Negligible Function). We call a function δ(n) as a negligible function if for all
c ∈ N, ∃n0 ∈ N such that δ(n) < n−c for all n > n0. We denote a negligible function in parameter
n as negl(n).
Definition 2.8 (Quantum Unlearnability). We consider a quantum polynomial-time algorithm A:
A classical oracle access to function f ; function f is sampled from Fn with an efficiently computable
testing distribution D over the domain {0, 1}n; let Af (1n)→ f˜ = (C, ρf ) be the output of A, where
C is a polynomial-size quantum or classical circuit and ρf is a (mixed) state.
A distinguisher Dist is a quantum polynomial-time algorithm having access to full description
of f , f˜ and testing distribution D; Dist samples polynomially many inputs x from D and check if
f˜(x) = f(x). Dist outputs 1 if and only if it finds any x such that f˜(x) 6= f(x); otherwise it outputs
0. We call a family of functions Fn quantumly unlearnable if for any such quantum polynomial-time
algorithm A, there exists a negligible function negl(n) for all n ∈ N such that:
Pr
f∈Fn
[
Dist(f, f˜ ,D) = 0 : f˜ ← Af (1n)
]
≤ negl(n). (1)
Through the paper, we will sometimes refer to this probability above as the probability that f˜
gets verified or the advantage of adversary A.
Definition 2.9 (Public Key Quantum Money). A public-key (publicly-verifiable) quantum money
should consists of the following algorithms:
• KeyGen(1n) → (sk, pk) : takes as input a security parameter n, and generates a key pair
(sk, pk).
• GenNote(sk)→ |$〉 : takes in a secret key sk and generates a quantum banknote state |$〉.
• Ver(pk, |$〉)→ 0/1 : takes as input public key pk, and a claimed money state |$〉, and outputs
either 1 for accept or 0 for reject.
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A secure public-key quantum money should satisfy the following properties:
Verification Correctness: there exists a negligible function negl(n) so that the following holds
for any n ∈ N:
Pr
(sk,pk)←KeyGen(1n)
[Ver(pk,GenNote(sk)) = 1] ≥ 1− negl(n)
Unclonable Security: Suppose a QPT adversary is given q = poly(n) number of valid bank
notes {ρ}i∈[q] and then gives q′ = q+1 number of claimed bank notes {ρ′j}j∈[q′] to verification
algorithm Ver; for any such QPT A, there exists a negligible function negl(n) for all n ∈ N
such that:
Pr
(sk,pk)←KeyGen(1n)
[∀i ∈ [q′],Ver(pk, ρ′j) = 1 : {ρ′j}j∈[q′] ← A(1n, {ρ}i∈[q])] ≤ negl(n)
Note that public key quantum money in fact refers to publicly verifiable quantum money, we
will conform with the tradition of calling it public key quantum money.
Definition 2.10 (Digital Signatures). A (classical) public-key digital signature scheme D consists
of three probabilistic polynomial-time classical algorithms:
• KeyGen(1n) → (sk, pk) : takes as input a security parameter n , and generates a secret and
public key pair (sk, pk).
• Sign(m, sk)→ (m,σ) : takes in secret key sk and a message m, and generates a signature σ.
• Ver(m,σ, pk) → 0/1 : takes as input public key pk, a message m, and a claimed signature σ,
and outputs either 1 for accept or 0 for reject.
A secure digital signature scheme should satisfy the following properties:
Verification Correctness: For any n ∈ N, so that the following holds:
Pr
(sk,pk)←KeyGen(1n)
[Ver(pk,m,Sign(sk,m)) = 1] = 1
Unforgeability: Suppose a PPT adversary A is given q = poly(n) number of valid signatures
from a signing oracle OSign on any message A queries, and then A gives a claimed signature
(σ∗,m∗) on m∗ not queried before; for any such PPT A, there exists a negligible function
negl(n) for all n ∈ N such that:
Pr
(sk,pk)←KeyGen(1n)
[Ver(pk, σ∗,m∗) = 1 : (σ∗,m∗)← AOSign(1n)] ≤ negl(n)
More cryptography primitives and assumptions used are given in Appendix B.
3 Quantum Copy-Protection Relative to a Classical Oracle
We define a correct and secure quantum copy-protection as follows.
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3.1 Quantum Copy-Protection Definition
Definition 3.1. Consider a family of functions Fn : X → Y, a quantum copy-protection scheme
for F consists of the following procedures:
Generation(1n, f) → (cp(f), |ψ〉): Given f ∈ Fn and parameter n, the vendor can generate a
copy-protected program cp(f) and a quantum key |ψ〉 in poly(n,m) time.
Computation(1n, cp(f), |ψ〉)→ ({y}y∈Y ): given (|ψ〉 , cp(f)), a user can compute the function f(x)
for any x ∈ X by running the program cp(f) in poly(n) time.
Correctness and Security We assume the quantum communication channel between the vendor
and the customer is secure.
A quantum copy-protection scheme with parameter n should satisfy the following properties:
Correctness: The customer with the key can compute the function f by running the program cp(f),
i.e.,
∀x ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr[cp(f)(x, |ψ〉) = f(x)] ≥ 1− negl(n) (2)
the probability is over the randomness used in generation of cp(f).
Anti-Piracy: The anti-piracy security is defined through the game below.
Setup Phase: The challenger (vendor) samples f ← F , and D is a testing distribution for
f .
Challenger runs Generation(1n, f) for k times to generate k copies of programs:{
(cp1(f), |ψ1〉), (cp2(f), |ψ2〉), . . . , (cpk(f), |ψk〉)
}
, (3)
Challenge Phase: The challenger gives the k copies of programs generated above to a quan-
tum polynomial-time adversary A.
Afterwards, A generates k + 1 programs P1, . . . ,Pk+1. Each program Pi consists of a
polynomial-size quantum circuit Ci and a (mixed) state ρi.
To verify these programs, consider the challenger now as a quantum polynomial-time
distinguisher algorithm Dist which knows the full description of the function f , testing
distribution D and is given the pirated programs P1, . . . , Pk+1. For each program Pi, Dist
outputs 1 if and only if any input-output difference can be found between Pi and f . We
say that the i-th program Pi is verified if Dist(Pi, f) = 0.
A wins if all {Pi}i∈[k+1] are verified.
The scheme has anti-piracy security if for any QPT adversary A, there exists a negligible
function negl(n) such that the following holds for any n ∈ N:
Pr
[
∀i ∈ [k + 1], Pi is verified : {Pi}i∈[k+1] ← A
({
(cpi, |ψi〉)
}
i∈[k]
)]
≤ negl(n). (4)
where the probability is taken over the choice of f ∈ F and the randomness used in the setup.
We sometimes denote the above probability as AdvA to be the advantage of A in the anti-piracy
security game.
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Note that each pirated program Pi for i ∈ [k] should consist of a polynomial size quantum/
classical circuit Ci and a mixed state ρi. If the circuit Ci produced is classical and does not need
auxiliary quantum input, the adversary is defined to always provide a useless ρi, such as n classical
bits of zeros. The distinguisher will then run program Pi on input x as Ci(ρi, x). Though the
distinguisher is QPT, it needs quantum resources only in order to run the pirated programs; its
verification criterion is solely on comparison of input-output behaviors of the pirated programs with
those of f and nothing else.
Remark 3.2. The testing distribution D over the inputs is important since D can be different for
different f sampled from the same family(for example, point functions). The role of the distin-
guisher Dist allows the pirate programs to be tested on a polynomial number of points sampled from
the distribution. For an unlearnable family of functions F , when we copy-protect f ∈ F , the dis-
tinguisher Dist uses the same testing distribution D corresponding to f from F as in Definition 2.8
to verify the pirate programs.
Remark 3.3. In this paper, the copy-protection scheme we present is based on a classical oracle,
which we will for simplicity refer to as O. Since the oracle O is public, not only does adversary
A have access to the O, the pirate programs produced by A also do. Sometimes we will use the
notation PO or CO to emphasize that the program or the circuit has access to O.
3.2 Quantum Copy-Protection Mini-scheme
In this section we take use of the subspace membership oracles in [AC12] to construct a quantum
copy-protection scheme.
First, we give a “mini-scheme” for quantum copy-protection, which is secure when giving out a
single distribution of software. In Section 5, we will show that we can generalize the mini-scheme
from one to polynomial number of copies.
Let Fn be a family of functions: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m where m = poly(n). We assume Fn is
quantumly unlearnable and can be computed by polynomial-size classical circuits.
The mini-scheme for quantum copy-protection of function f ∈ Fn is as follows:
Generation: The vendor picks a uniformly random subspace A ⊆ Fn of dimension n/2 and prepares
a subspace state on n qubits corresponding to A:
|A〉 = 1√
|F|n/2
∑
v∈A
|v〉 . (5)
as the key of the program. The classical description of A is kept private.
The vendor then generates two classical(boolean function) oracles, UA, UA⊥ which are mem-
bership oracles of subspace A and its dual subspace A⊥.
Next, it generates an oracle O such that
O(x, v) =

f(x)⊕ g(x) if v ∈ A and v 6= 0,
g(x) if v ∈ A⊥ and v 6= 0,
h(x) otherwise.
(6)
where g, h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} are uniformly random functions.
O checks if v is in A or A⊥ by querying UA, UA⊥ on v.
Finally, vendor gives |A〉 via a secure quantum channel to the customer and publishes the
oracle O as well as membership oracles UA, UA⊥ .
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Computation: Note that with subspace state |A〉, we can get the subspace state ∣∣A⊥〉 by applying
a Quantum Fourier Transform to n qubits, i.e.
∣∣A⊥〉 = H⊗n |A〉 . To compute f(x), customer
can run the program as
O(x, |A〉)⊕O(x,H⊗n |A〉). (7)
Note that the customer will first query O(x, |A〉) and then O(x,H⊗n |A〉). Hence, only one
piece of |A〉 is enough for the computation.
For notation we denote the copy-protected program cp(f) as the oracle access to O for function f
(as well as UA, UA⊥ implicitly). The customer receives the full program as (cp(f), |A〉). Throughout
the paper, the oracle notation O refers to the specific copy-protection oracle described above.
4 Analysis of The Mini-Scheme
In this section, we’ll show that the mini-scheme satisfies the Definition 3.1 of quantum copy-
protection.
Correctness and Efficiency For the Generation part, as shown in [AC12], given the basis of A,
the subspace state can be prepared in polynomial time. For the oracle, it only needs to check the
membership of A and A⊥. Hence, assuming the truth tables of f, g, h are given, the oracle O can
be generated in polynomial time. Therefore, the whole Generation part can be done in poly(n, |F|)
time.
For the Computation part, the program can compute f(x) with high probability. Because for
all input x ∈ {0, 1}n with a valid state |A〉, cp(f)(x, |A〉) 6= f(x) happens with only negligible
probability 1
|F|n/2−1
, when UA(|A〉) outputs 0 or UA⊥(
∣∣A⊥〉) outputs 0.
Because of this high success probability of a single-round computation, by the gentle measure-
ment lemma Theorem 2.6, the state |A〉 can be used for polynomial many times.
4.1 Anti-Piracy Security
Next we show that the quantum copy-protection mini-scheme for any unlearnable families of func-
tions Fn has anti-piracy against any quantum polynomial-time adversaries. More formally:
Theorem 4.1. Given a copy-protected program for function f ∈ Fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, i.e. the
oracle access to cp(f) and a subspace state |A〉, for any QPT adversary A, there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that for any n ∈ N and any unlearnable family of functions Fn, the following
holds:
Pr
[
(P1,P2) are both verified : (P1,P2)← A
(
1n, cp(f), |A〉 )] ≤ negl(n). (8)
Later, for notational convenience, we denote
AdvA(cp(f),|A〉) := Pr[(P1,P2) are verified : (P1,P2)← A
(
1n, cp(f), |A〉 )]. (9)
To prove the theorem, we first need to show that the problem of finding two non-zero points
in A and A⊥ respectively with only one copy of |A〉 is hard for any QPT adversary. This is called
the “Direct-Product Problem” in [AC12]. It is clear that if the adversary A is able to find two
vectors (u, v) where u ∈ A− {0} and v ∈ A⊥ − {0}, A can just put them together with the oracle
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access to the function computation oracle O to make two successfully verifies pirated programs
P1 = (C
O
1 , (u1, v1)),P2 = (C
O
2 , (u2, v2)) where (u1, v1), (u2, v2) are (u, v) found by A. Both P1,P2
work by querying the oracle O to obtain the f(x) on any x. Then anti-piracy security is broken.
The hardness of the direct-product problem was proved by Ben-David and Sattath [BDS16]:
Theorem 4.2 ([BDS16]). Let ǫ > 0 be such that 1/ǫ = o(2n/2). Given one copy of |A〉 and a
subspace membership oracle of A and A⊥, an adversary needs Ω(
√
ǫ2n/4) queries to output a pair
of non-zero vectors (u, v) such that u ∈ A and v ∈ A⊥ with probability at least ǫ.
Since in later security reductions we will refer to the direct-product problem as a security game,
here we briefly describe the game:
Setup Phase: the challenger samples a random n/2-dimensional subspace A from Fn2 ; then prepares
the membership oracle UA for A, UA⊥ for the dual subspace A
⊥ and a quantum state |A〉,
the equal superposition of all elements in A.
Query Phase: challenger sends |A〉 to adversary; the adversary can query UA, UA⊥ for polynomially
many times.
Challenge Phase: adversary outputs two vectors (u, v); challenger checks if: (1) (u, v) are nonzero;
(2) u ∈ A, v ∈ A⊥. If these are satisfied, then adversary wins.
We review the proof for Theorem 4.2 in Appendix A. And we immediately have a corollary for
QPT adversaries:
Corollary 4.3. For any QPT adversary, given one copy of |A〉, where random subspace A ⊂
F
n,dim(A) = n/2 and given access to subspace membership oracles of A and A⊥, the probability
of finding a pair of non-zero vectors (u, v) such that u ∈ A and v ∈ A⊥ is negligible in n for any
n ∈ N.
For the rest of the paper, when we discuss a pair of vectors (u, v), we implicitly refer to non-zero
vectors u ∈ A and v ∈ A⊥.
Two Types of Adversary In the next steps, we show that any adversary which breaks the
copy protection scheme would either help solve the direct product problem efficiently or violate the
unlearnable property of the underlying function.
For some QPT adversary A which has passed verification and PO is one of the pirate programs
produced by A, we devide the queries made by P into two categories, informational and not
informational.
All the queries from P to O are in the form of (x, u), where u is an element in the vector space
for membership checking. If there exists at least one query that gets a reply for f(x) ⊕ g(x) and
another one with reply for g(x), for the same x, then we call these queries informational ; one
of these two queries must be on (x, u), for some u ∈ A and the other query on (x, v) for some
v ∈ A⊥. Otherwise if no queries can get replies of both f(x) ⊕ g(x) and g(x) for any x, they are
not informational ; these queries are on (x, u) for u ∈ A and u in neither A nor A⊥, or on (x, u) for
u ∈ A⊥ and u in neither.
We divide the adversaries for the quantum copy protection mini-scheme into two categories and
analyze them respectively:
Type 1: All the pirate programs produced by the adversary will make informational queries
Type 2: At least one pirate program produced by the adversary will not make any informational
queries.
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4.1.1 Type 1 Adversary
We show that if all pirate programs produced by A make informational queries, then we can
extract the information of (u, v) from their queries; otherwise if at least one pirate program makes
no informational query or no query at all, then we can use it to quantumly learn the copy-protected
function with only black-box access.
Lemma 4.4. For any randomly chosen A ⊂ Fn2 with dim(A) = n/2, if there exists some QPT
adversary A in the (mini-scheme) anti-piracy security game for some f ∈ Fn with a testing distri-
bution D and A produces two successfully verified pirate programs PO1 ,PO2 with advantage ǫ, such
that the queries made by P1,P2 to O are informational, then there is a QPT algorithm to obtain
two non-zero vectors (u, v) with probability ǫ′ = ǫ/q, where u ∈ A, v ∈ A⊥, and q = poly(n).
Proof. The challenger in the copy protection security game plays as the adversary in breaking
direct-product hardness, denoted as A1. In the reduction, A1 is given the membership oracle
access to UA, U
⊥
A and state |A〉.
Next, we show that A1 can simulate the copy protection security game for A using the infor-
mation given and uses A to obtain the two vectors. A1 samples f ∈ F by itself, and simulates the
anti-piracy game defined in Definition 3.1, specifically simulating the copy protection oracle O for
adversary A as follows:
1) A1 gives state |A〉 and oracle access of UA, UA⊥ to A.
2) On query (x, v) from A, A1 queries UA, UA⊥ on v.
3) If UA(v) = 1, A1 computes f(x). After A1 computes f(x), it samples a random string gx
from the range of f (for example, gx
$←− {0, 1} if it is a Boolean function).
Then, B sends f(x)⊕ gx to A as the query answer.
Note that A1 needs to keep a table of x and its corresponding gx. Everytime on query of x,
A1 first goes through the table to see if gx has already been recorded before. Otherwise, A1
samples a gx and adds it to the table. Since there are only polynomially many queries, A1
only needs polynomial time and space to record gx.
4) If UA⊥(v) = 1, A1 sends gx to A. The generation of gx is the same as above.
5) If both UA⊥(v) = 0 and UA(v) = 0, A1 samples another hx from the range and keeps a table
of hx as it does for gx. A1 sends hx to A.
We can see that A1 perfectly simulates the copy-protection oracle O. In the end, A outputs two
pirate programs P1,P2 and sends A1. A1 first runs the verification algorithm by testing inputs from
D to verify the two quantum programs produced by adversary. If they do not pass verification, A1
aborts.
Once the adversary’s pirated programs have passed verification, A1 then runs each pirate pro-
grams P1, P2 again on a polynomial number of inputs sampled from D. This time, it destructively
measures random two queries, one from P1 and one from P2. For each of these measurements, the
reduction takes the n-bit information in the second half of the register (i.e. the u-part in (x, u)),
denoted as u∗, v∗; then A1 queries the membership oracles UA and UA⊥ on u∗, v∗ respectively to
see which subspace they are in.
We require that both pirate programs need to make informational queries and the reduction
measures both programs’ queries, sinceA can always just give the entire state |A〉 to one of the pirate
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programs such that this program makes informational query using |A〉, but making a destructive
measurement to this program’s query will give us only one vector in A or one in A⊥.
Since each Pi can make at most polynomially many queries, A1 can obtain vectors (u∗, v∗)
that solve Direct-Product problem, with 1/poly(n) probability given that P1, P2 make informa-
tional queries. Since A has non-negligible advantage, A1 has non-negligible advantage with only a
1/poly(n) factor of loss.
4.1.2 Type 2 Adversary
Next, we analyze the case if we cannot find both u and v from the queries made by P1,P2 to O.
Then it means at least one of them only gets replies with the information of (f(x)⊕ g(x), h(x)) or
the information of (g(x), h(x)), for all the x queried. Since both g, h are random functions, these
replies are random strings uncorrelated with f(x). In this case, the adversary has in fact produced
a pirate program P that does not need to query the real oracle O to get passed the verification
test. All the query replies can be simulated by sampling random values and keeping a table to be
consistent on the values.
Lemma 4.5. For any unlearnable function family F and f ∈ F with a testing distribution D, if
there exists some QPT adversary A that produces two successfully verified pirate programs with
advantage ǫ in the anti-piracy security game; and at least one program P makes no informational
queries to O, then there exists a QPT algorithm that learns f with probability ǫ/c, where c = poly(n).
Proof. We show the lemma above by showing the following:
AdvA(1n,cp(f),|A〉) ≤ c · AdvA2(1n,Of ) (10)
A2 is a QPT adversary trying to learn f with only black-box access to f given in Definition 2.8;
we denote this black box as a classical oracle Of , which on any query x ∈ X , answers the query
with y = f(x). Here, AdvA2(1n,Of ) = Pr[A2(1n,Of ) quantumly learns f ] = Pr[P is verified : P ←
A2(1n,Of )].
The challenger in the copy protection security game plays as the adversary in learning a function
f using only black-box access: function f along with an input distribution D, is sampled from a
function family F . This adversary is denoted as A2. In the reduction, A2 is given the oracle access
to Of .
Next, we show that A2 can simulate the copy protection security game for A using the infor-
mation given and uses A to quantumly learn f . A2 samples random n/2-dimensional subspace A
over F2 and prepares the membership oracles (unitary matrices) UA, U
⊥
A as well as state |A〉; it
simulates the copy protection oracle O as follows:
1) A2 gives state |A〉 and oracle access of UA, UA⊥ to A.
2) On query (x, v) from A, A2 applies the unitaries UA, UA⊥ on v.
3) If UA(v) = 1, A1 queries Of on input x. After A2 obtains f(x), it samples a random string
gx from the range of f(for example, gx
$←− {0, 1} if it is a Boolean function).
B sends f(x)⊕ gx to A as the query answer.
Note that A2 needs to keep a table of x and its corresponding gx. Every-time on query of x,
A2 first goes through the table to see if gx has already been recorded before. Otherwise, A2
samples a gx and adds it to the table. Since there are only polynomially many queries, A2
only needs polynomial time and space to record gx.
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4) If UA⊥(v) = 1, A2 sends gx to A. The generation of gx is the same as above.
5) If both UA⊥(v) = 0 and UA(v) = 0, A1 samples another hx from the range and keeps a table
of hx as it does for gx. A2 sends hx to A.
We can see that A2 perfectly simulates the copy-protection oracle O for A. In the end, A
outputs two pirate program P1,P2 and sends A1.
A2 randomly chooses one of the pirate programs in P1, P2; we denote this chosen program as P
for simplicity. Importantly, an adversary that successfully learns a function in Definition 2.8 needs
to produce a polynomial-size quantum circuit and a state that computes f without making any
oracle queries. We show how A2 can obtain such a circuit-state tuple from P.
If P makes no query to O at all, then A2 simply sends it to the function-learning challenger as
A2’s own output. If P makes query only on u ∈ A or u in neither A or A⊥, A2 can modify this
program, a circuit-state tuple P = (CO, ρ), into a circuit-state tuple that does not make any query
to O through the following steps:
• A2 adds an additional circuit supp, together with randomness of length poly(n), in order to
answer C’s queries
• If P makes queries on u ∈ A and u in neither A nor A⊥:
– queries on (x, u) will be answered by supp sampling a uniform random string sx if u ∈ A
or another uniform random string hx if u /∈ A;
– keeps a table of queried x and sampled strings to be consistent on the same query
• If P makes queries on u ∈ A⊥ and u in neither A nor A⊥
– supp samples random gx if u ∈ A⊥, hx if u /∈ A⊥
– keeps a table of randomly sampled gx for u ∈ A⊥ and hx for u /∈ A⊥ to be consistent
Note that supp can be given the information of A and A⊥ since now C does not make any
query to O and A, A⊥ are completely independent of any information in f . Because P = (CO, ρ)
presumably does not make any informational query to O, P′ and P have the same functionality.
And since C makes only polynomially many queries, supp is only polynomial sized.
Now, A2 has obtained a circuit-state tuple P′ = (Csupp, ρ) which does not have access to oracle
O and functions the same as P produced by A. A2 simply submits P′ to the function-learning
challenger as its own output. If A’s programs are supposed to pass the copy-protection verification,
Pr[Dist(CO(ρ, ·), f,D) = 0] ≥ ǫ, for some non-negligible probability ǫ and if A2 picks the program
that makes no informational query, then A2 will successfully “learn” the function f with the same
input distribution D for verifying pirate programs, that is: Pr[Dist(Csupp(ρ, ·), f,D) = 0] ≥ ǫ. The
program P′ gets verified with probability ǫ.
Therefore, AdvA(1n,cp(f),|A〉) ≤ c ·AdvA2(1n,Of ) for c equals one over the probability that A2 picks
the program that actually does not make any informational query. If A2 randomly chooses one of
the two programs, then A2 has at least 1/2 probability of picking the right program given that A
produces at least one program with no informational queries.
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Conclusion With Lemma 4.5, Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.2, we are able to prove the security of
the mini-scheme:
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For any QPT adversary A, given the copy protected program for (f,D)
sampled from a family of functions F ,
AdvA(1n,cp(f),|A〉) ≤ q(n) · Pr[A1(1n, f, UA, U⊥A , |A〉) solves direct product problem]
+ c(n) · Pr[A2(1n,Of ) quantumly learns f ]
where q and c are some polynomials of n, as we specified in Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5.
By the definition of quantumly unlearnable functions, we have Pr[A2(1n,Of ) quantum learns f ] ≤
negl1(n) for some negligible function negl1. And by Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.3, we have
Pr[A1(1n, f, UA, U⊥A , |A〉) solves direct product problem] ≤ negl2(n) for some negligible function
negl2. Therefore, we can conclude Theorem 4.1.
5 Generalized Construction
5.1 Polynomial Copies of Program Distributions
In this section, we extend the secure quantum money mini-scheme to a construction of polynomially
many copy-protection programs for the same function f ∈ F : P1,P2, · · · ,Pk for k is a polynomial
of n.
Let F be a quantumly unlearnable family of functions and f ∈ F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. We
define the generalized quantum copy-protection scheme for f as follows:
• For each i = 1, 2, · · · , k, the vendor runs the mini-scheme generation process for f :
– Sample a random n/2-dimensional subspace Ai ⊂ Fn2 ; a random function gi : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m and another random function hi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m.
– Generate program Pi = (cpi(f), |Ai〉) as follows. Prepare a subspace state on n qubits
corresponding to Ai:
|Ai〉 = 1√|F|n/2 ∑v∈Ai |v〉 . (11)
as the key for the program. The classical description of Ai is kept private. Prepare
membership oracles UAi , UA⊥i
.
Prepare an oracle Oi such that it computes the following:
Oi(x, v) =

f(x)⊕ gi(x) if v ∈ Ai and v 6= 0,
gi(x) if v ∈ A⊥i and v 6= 0,
hi(x) otherwise,
(12)
O checks if v is in A or A⊥ by querying UAi , UA⊥i .
cpi(f) denotes the oracle access Oi, as well as UAi , UA⊥i .
• Distribute the programs P1, · · · ,Pk to an authorized customer via a secure quantum channel.
Remark 5.1. The random function gi which is used to mask the value of f(x) must be chosen with
fresh randomness at the preparation for each program Pi. If we use the same g for two programs
Pi,Pj, the adversary can easily attack by creating a program that queries Oi with a vector in Ai
and Oj with a vector in A⊥j .
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Attack by Intersections of Subspaces We analyze the (im)possibility of an obvious attack.
One simple attack to the general scheme is that the adversary buys two pieces of programs
cp1(f), |A1〉) and cp2(f), |A2〉). By measuring |A1〉, it gets a point u ∈ A1. By measuring |A2〉
(or H⊗n |A2〉), it gets a point u ∈ A2 (or A⊥2 ). If u happens to be in A⊥1 , then the scheme is broken.
However, we can show that the probability that A2 or A
⊥
2 has nontrivial intersection (intersection
of elements other than the zero element) with A1 is negligible. More generally, even for polynomial
number of different randomly chosen subspaces of dimension n/2, the probability that there exist
any two subspaces where one has non-trivial intersection with the other (or the dual subspace of
it) is negligible.
Claim 5.2. Given k = poly(n) uniformly random subspaces A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ Fn, each with dimension
n/2, the probability that there exist i, j ∈ [k] such that dim(Ai ∩Aj) ≥ n/8 is negligible.
Proof. Fix two different indices i and j, consider subspaces Ai and Aj : Ai and Aj are chosen
randomly and independently from S(n); each basis vector is selected with probability 1/2. The
intersection Ai∩Aj is also a subspace and let dim(Ai∩Aj) be the dimension of Ai∩Aj. We denote
the random variable Xa as the a-th basis vector is selected to be a basis vector for both Ai and Aj ,
for a ∈ [n]. Clearly, ∑na E[Xa] = n/4. We can bound the probability of obtaining an intersection
with dimension ≥ n8 using Chernoff bound:
Pr
[
dim(Ai ∩Aj) ≥ n
8
]
= Pr
[
n∑
a=1
Xa ≥ 1
2
· E[Xa]
]
≤ e−Θ(n) (13)
Then for any two subspaces in A1, . . . , Ak, we can obtain the possibility that they intersect with
a larger than n/8-dimensional subspace, by union bound,
Pr
[
∃i, j : dim(Ai ∩Aj) ≥ n
8
]
≤ O(k2) · Pr
[
dim(Ai ∩Aj) ≥ n
8
]
(14)
≤ poly(n) · e−Θ(n) = negl(n).
An 8/n-dimensional subspace is only a negligible portion in any n/2-dimensional subspace; more-
over, the probability for the existence of an intersection with dimension larger than 8/n is negligible.
Hence, the probability that there exists a non-negligible intersection between any two random sub-
spaces is extremely small.
Therefore, A1, A2, . . . , Ak have only negligible portions of intersections with overwhelmingly
large probability, then exploiting A2, . . . , Ak can hardly help finding two vectors in Ai, A
⊥
i for any
i ∈ [k]. There is only quadratic improvement even for a quantum adversary using Grover search to
find an element in the intersection by the Grover search lower bound. Hence, this kind of attack
can be ruled out.
Theorem 5.3. For any quantumly unlearnable family of functions F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, and
any f ∈ Fn, given k = poly(n) copies of programs (cp1(f), |A1〉), . . . , (cpk(f), |Ak〉) constructed as
above, then for any quantum polynomial-time adversary A, A cannot break anti-piracy except with
negligible probability.
Proof. If there exists a QPT adversary that successfully produces k+1 number of pirate programs
P1,P2, · · · ,Pk+1, then we can follow the proof for the mini-scheme security in Section 4.1 to show
that these pirate programs can either be used to extract two non-zero vectors in Ai, A
⊥
i for some
i ∈ [k], or be used to violate unlearnability of the protected function.
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If all pirate programs {Pi}i∈[k+1] make informational queries to the k oracles {Oi}i∈[k] given in
{cp(f)}i∈[k], then by pigeonhole principle, there must be two programs Pi,Pj that make queries to
the same oracle Oℓ for some ℓ ∈ [k]. Since both of these two programs make informational queries,
i.e. they obtain both f(x) ⊕ gℓ(x) and gℓ(x) from their queries for some x in the domain, we can
then follow similar argument in Lemma 4.4 and obtain two nonzero vectors in Aℓ and A
⊥
ℓ . The
reduction algorithm A1 can first guess the oracle Ol that will be queried by two pirate programs;
A1 uses the oracles it receives from a Direct-Product challenge to prepare Ol and prepares the
rest of membership oracles by sampling subspaces itself. The rest of the proof is the same as in
Lemma 4.4. A1 now has a 1/k factor of loss in advantage compared to its advantage in Lemma 4.4,
due to guessing.
If there exists one pirate program P′i that makes no informational queries to any oracles in
{Oi}i∈[k], then it obtains no actual computation result f(x) for all x in the domain from the oracles;
we follow the argument from Lemma 4.5 to show that a QPT reduction can use this program P′i
to quantumly learn the unlearnable function f . A2 has a 2/(k + 1) factor of loss in advantage
compared to its advantage in Lemma 4.5, since it now randomly picks from k + 1 programs.
5.2 Further Security through Authorization
Though the above contruction for k copies of programs is secure against QPT adversaries, if we
want to further extend the generalization of any mini-scheme to polynomial copies, not necessarily
relative to an oracle, we can add authorization to each copy of program. Following Aaronson and
Christiano [AC12], we can enhance the security for polynomially many copy-protection programs by
adding quantum-secure digital signatures. By adding authorization information, we make sure that
the adversary can only attack by pirating one underlying copy-protection mini-scheme, rendering
an attack by ”combining” the information obtained from several programs as impossible. Then
the security of polynomial-copy construction is reduced to the security of digital signature and
mini-scheme.
Let F be a quantumly unlearnable family of functions and f ∈ F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. Let
S = (KeyGenS ,SignS ,VerS) be a digital signature scheme. We first define the general quantum
copy-protection scheme for f as follows:
• The vendor first runs the mini-scheme generation process for f and gets (cp(f), |A〉). The
vendor also creates a random classical serial number sA for it. Note that cp(f) denotes the
oracle access O.
• The vendor runs KeyGenD and gets the private-key kprivate,A and public-key kpublic,A.
• The published program is (c˜p(f), |A〉 ,SignS(s, kprivate,A)), where c˜p(f) computes f by query-
ing a new oracle O˜ defined as:
O˜(x, v, w) =
{
⊥ if VerS(w, kpublic,A) = 0,
O(x, v) otherwise. (15)
Theorem 5.4. For any quantumly unlearnable family of functions F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, and
any f ∈ F , given k = poly(n) copies of programs (c˜p1(f), |A1〉 , w1), . . . , (c˜pk(f), |Ak〉 , wk) and
given that the quantum copy-protection mini-scheme satisfies anti-piracy and the digital signature
scheme S is quantum-secure, then no quantum polynomial-time adversary A can break the standard
construction except with negligible probability.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an quantum polynomial time adversary that can break the general
scheme with non-negligible probability, i.e., she can generate k+1 programs P1, . . . ,Pk+1 such that
Pr
[
∀i ∈ [k + 1] Pi is verified : {Pi}i∈[k+1] ← A
(
{(cpj, |Aj〉 , wj)}j∈[k]
)]
≥ ǫ (16)
For some non-negligible probability ǫ.
Let σi be the signature of Pi. Since the oracle O will first check the signature of the serial
number of the program, it means that
Pr
[∀i ∈ [k + 1] : VerD(σi, kpublic,i) = 1] ≥ ǫ (17)
By the security of the digital signature scheme D, it is impossible for any quantum polynomial time
adversary to generate one more different signature from k signatures w1, . . . , wk that can pass the
verification with non-negligible probability. Hence, there exists i1, i2 ∈ [k+1] and j ∈ [k] such that
σi1 = σi2 = wj , which means that the adversary can pirate the j-th program with non-negligible
probability ǫ. Or equivalently,
Pr
[
Pi1 and Pi2 are verified : (Pi1 , Pi2)← A(cpj(f), |Aj〉)
] ≥ ǫ. (18)
By the security of the mini-scheme (Theorem 4.1), we know that the j-th program cannot be cloned
or pirated. And by Claim 5.2, the other k − 1 programs cannot provide non-negligible advantage
in copying the j-th program.
Therefore the general copy-protection scheme is secure.
Remark 5.5. The essential goal for quantum copy protection is not to prevent adversaries from
creating “unauthorized” programs, but to prevent them from creating any programs that compute
the copy-protected function correctly, even if they can be identified as pirate. Here we offer a way to
guarantee security for any generalized copy-protection schemes, not necessarily in the oracle setting.
5.2.1 Quantum-Secure Digital Signatures
Rompel [Rom90] showed that any one-way function implies (chosen-message) secure public-key
signature scheme and the security reduction is black-box. Security reductions lifted from classical
to post-quantum signature schemes are also discussed in [Son14], which showed that the classical
generic construction of hash-tree based signatures from one-way functions carry over to the quantum
setting. Though we have the information theoretically secure quantum digital signature schemes
built from quantum one-way functions in [GC01], it has the limitation that only a limited number
of copies can be in circulation, or the scheme becomes insecure; thus [GC01] can not be applied to
our scheme.
Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13] show that quantum chosen message queries give an adversary more
power than classical chosen message queries by presenting a signature scheme that is secure under
classical queries but insecure once an adversary can make quantum queries. In our case we only
consider adversaries which have access to quantum resources but interact classically with oracles.
Therefore, if there exists classical one-way functions secure against quantum attack, there exists a
secure digital signature scheme against quantum chosen message attack that we need.
6 Public Key Quantum Money from Copy Protection
Quantum copy-protection and quantum money are closely related. In this section, we give two
constructions from general quantum copy-protection scheme to build public-key quantum money:
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one using a CCA2-secure public-key encryption scheme; one using a trapdoor function. The con-
struction based on CCA2-secure PKE has a reliable post-quantum PKE primitive based on LWE
problem; on the other hand, the construction from trapdoor functions may be more lightweight
due to simpler underlying primitives.
Without specification, the quantum copy-protection scheme used refers to a general quantum
copy protection for all quantumly unlearnable functions.
6.1 Public-Key Quantum Money from CCA-secure Public-Key Encryption
We give the definition of a public-key encryption scheme and CCA2 security (often simply referred
to as CCA security) in Definition B.3. Quantum CCA-security was studied in [BZ13] where the
adversary can make quantum superposition queries to the encryption and decryption oracles. By
our definition of quantum copy protection security and quantum unlearnability, the oracle queries
are classical and the programs can also only output classical computation results; therefore, we
can consider a notion of “weak quantum CCA security” where the QPT adversary has quantum
resources but only queries the encryption and decryption oracles classically. The weak quantum
CCA-security definition will be the same as given in Definition B.3 except that the adversary is
QPT.
CCA-secure PKE Schemes [BZ13] presents a proof that public-key quantum CCA can be
obtained from any identity-based encryption scheme that is selectively secure under a quantum
chosen identity attack and such an identity-based encryption scheme can be built from lattice
assumptions, specifically the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption (Definition B.4). Since their
security requirement is the “strong” quantum CCA security where adversary can make quantum
queries, it also satisfies the weak quantum CCA-security we need.
Another candidate scheme is a CCA-secure McEliece based public-key cryptosystem in the
standard model from [DDMQN12], since McEliece public-key cryptography is yet known to be
broken by quantum adversaries either.
Let us simply assume the quantum resistance of LWE assumption, we can have:
Theorem 6.1. Assume that the Learning With Errors problem with certain parameters is hard for
BQP and there exists a secure quantum copy-protection scheme, then there exists a secure public-key
quantum money scheme.
6.1.1 Public-key Quantum Money Scheme I
Assume that we have an underlying public key encryption scheme called PKE, whose description
and the message space M are public. The public-key quantum money scheme I is as follows:
KeyGen(1n)→ (pk, sk) : takes in security parameter n; run PKE.KeyGen(1n)→ (PKE.pk,PKE.sk).
It also generates a testing parameter k = poly(n).
Outputs pk = (PKE.pk, k) and sk = PKE.sk.
GenNote(sk) → |$〉 : takes in the secret key; run Generation algorithm of cp for the decryption
function PKE.Dec(sk, ·) to generate cp(PKE.Dec(sk, ·)).
Outputs |$〉 = cp(PKE.Dec(sk, ·)).
Ver(pk, |$〉)→ 0/1 : takes in the public key pk = (PKE.pk, k) and a claimed banknote state |$〉 = P,
i.e. a claimed copy-protection program for PKE.Dec(sk, ·). First, it samples k number of
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uniformly random mi ← M, compute ci = PKE.Enc(pk,mi), for each i ∈ [k]. Next, runs P
on ci and checks if P(ci) = mi, for each i ∈ [k]; if all of the evaluations are equal, output 1
for accept, otherwise 0 for reject.
6.1.2 Security Analysis
Verification Correctness By the computation correctness of the underlying copy-protection cp
and decryption correctness of the underlying PKE, a valid banknote |$〉 = cp(PKE.Enc(pk, ·)) is
supposed to compute PKE.Dec(sk, c) on a ciphertext c = PKE.Enc(pk,m) for any m ∈ M correctly,
with all but negligible probability. Therefore, verification correctness holds.
Unclonable Security We give a brief proof for the unclonable security of the quantum money
scheme, whose security definition is given in Definition 2.9. We view the decryption functions
PKE.Dec(sk, ·), where sk← PKE.KeyGen(1n) as a family of functions.
Claim 6.2. Assuming that PKE is quantum CCA-secure, the family of decryption functions PKE.Dec(sk, ·),
where (sk, pk)← PKE.KeyGen(1n) is quantumly unlearnable (even given pk), where the distinguisher
uses a testing distribution Du over inputs that are encryptions of uniform random messages from
message space using the corresponding public key pk.
Proof. Suppose there exists some QPT adversary A for which the decryption function family is
quantumly learnable with respect to the testing distribution Du, then we can construct a QPT
adversary B who can break weak quantum CCA security.
After the setup phase, B passes public information it receives from the challenger to A. During
the query phase of CCA security game, B simply passes A’s computation queries on c to the
decryption oracle; the oracle will return m or ⊥ and B sends the reply to A. During challenge
phase, B chooses uniform random messages m0,m1 ←M and queries the encryption oracle to get a
challenge ciphertext ct = Enc(pk,mb). B does the same thing during the query phase after challenge
as the query phase before. After A goes into its challenge phase, it will provide a quantum circuit
C that supposedly computes Dec(sk, ·). B applies C on ct and gets m′b. If A has non-negligible
advantage ǫ in successfully learning PKE.Dec(sk, ·), then we have m′b = mb with probability ǫ.
Therefore, B breaks weak quantum CCA security with advantage ǫ.
We can then conclude that the decryption function can be copy-protected with respect to this
testing distribution Du, the same distribution used in Ver of the quantum money scheme.
Corollary 6.3. Assuming that quantum copy-protection scheme cp has anti-piracy security and
PKE is (weak) quantum CCA-secure, then public-key quantum money scheme I has unclonable
security.
Proof. By Claim 6.2, if PKE is (weak) quantum CCA-secure, PKE.Dec is quantumly unlearnable;
therefore, it can be securely copy-protected since we assume the existence of a general copy-
protection scheme for quantumly unlearnable functions. Suppose there is a QPT adversary A
that breaks unclonable security, then we can construct a QPT adversary B that breaks anti-piracy
security for cp.
The quantum copy protection challenger will copy-protect a decryption function of PKE: it
first runs the setup PKE.KeyGen and publishes the public key pk; then generates k copies of copy
protection program {cpi(Dec(sk, ·))}i∈[k] and gives them to B. Then B sends pk to A as the public
key for quantum money and {cpi(Dec(sk, ·))}i∈[k] as k money states {|$〉}i∈[k]. Finally, A output
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k + 1 number of claimed money states {ρi}i∈[k+1] and sends to B. B uses them as its pirate
programs and passes to copy-protection challenger. Since the testing distributions for the money
states and copy protection of PKE.Dec are the same, if A has non-negligible advantage ǫ, then B
has non-negligible advantage ǫ.
6.2 Public-key Quantum Money from Trapdoor Functions
The family of trapdoor functions we need for our construction requires three more properties, in
addition to Definition B.2:
• Injective: we need these trapdoor functions to be injective so that their inverses can be
computed correctly and anyone can verify them with only negligible error.
• Uniform testing distribution: for an injective trapdoor function f ∈ F : X → Y, we can verify,
using a testing distribution Du, if a program P is a copy-protection program for inversion
function with trapdoor g(t, ·), where t sampled with f from F , such that g(t, f(x)) = x,∀x ∈
X . The testing inputs in Du is obtained by sampling uniformly random x← X and computing
y = f(x). Then the verification is to check if P(y) = x.
• Quantum unlearnability of inverse: for a family of injective trapdoor functions F : X → Y,
the family of its inversion functions
{g(t, ·) : ∀x ∈ X , g(t, f(x)) = x, f ∈ F , t is a trapdoor sampled with f}
is quantumly unlearnable, with respect to testing distribution Du.
For rest of this section, we will refer to these inversion functions {g(t, ·)} where the correspond-
ing trapdoor function F satisfies the above properties, as inverse trapdoor functions for short.
Many existing trapdoor function constructions satisfy the injective property and uniform testing
distribution property. The third property is less trivial: inversion of trapdoor functions cannot be
computed efficiently by their one-wayness , but giving the adversary an inversion oracle is more
power; we will give some discussions on candidate trapdoor functions.
Theorem 6.4. If there exists a secure quantum copy-protection scheme and certain quantum-secure
injective trapdoor functions, then there exists a secure public-key quantum money scheme.
6.2.1 Public Key Quantum Money Scheme II
Our public key quantum money scheme II is as follows. We assume that we already have an
underlying quantum copy-protection scheme cp and we have a trapdoor function family F .
KeyGen(1n,F)→ (pk, sk) : takes in security parameter n and a description of a trapdoor function
family F : {0.1}m → {0, 1}l ,m, l = poly(n); samples f and its corresponding trapdoor t from
F , and generates a testing parameter k = poly(n).
Outputs pk = (k, f(·)) and sk = g(t, ·), where f(·) and g(t, ·) are presented in descriptions.
GenNote(sk)→ |$〉 : takes in the secret key, the inverse trapdoor function g(t, ·) and runs Generation
algorithm of cp to generate cp(g(t, ·)), a copy-protection program for g(t, ·).
Outputs |$〉 = cp(g(t, ·)).
21
Ver(pk, |$〉) → 0/1 : takes in the public key f , testing parameter k and a claimed banknote state
|$〉 = P, i.e. a claimed copy-protection program for g(t, ·). It samples k number of uniformly
random xi ← {0, 1}m, compute yi = f(xi), for each i ∈ [k]. Next, runs P on yi and checks if
P(yi) = xi for each i ∈ [k]; if all of the evaluations are equal, output 1 for accept, otherwise
0 for reject.
6.2.2 Security Analysis
Verification Correctness: By the computation correctness of the underlying copy-protection
cp, a valid banknote |$〉 = cp(g(t, ·)) is supposed to compute g(t, y) on any valid y = f(x) correctly.
with all but negligible probability. Therefore, verification correctness holds.
Unclonable Security
Claim 6.5. Assume that quantum copy-protection scheme cp has anti-piracy security and the copy-
protected trapdoor functions satisfy the properties of injectiveness, Du as testing distribution and
quantum unlearnability of inverses, then public key quantum money scheme II has unclonable se-
curity.
Since the inverse trapdoor functions have quantumly unlearnability with respect to distribution
Du, the proof idea is the same as Corollary 6.3 except by replacing the copy-protected function
with f−1t and the public key with f .
Discussions on Candidate Trapdoor Functions: A candidate trapdoor function built from
the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption is the injective trapdoor function in [GPV07] using
a Type-I or a [MP12] lattice trapdoor . It satisfies the first two properties we need.
One question remains whether its inverse function has the property of being quantumly unlearn-
able. [Reg10] shows that if the oracle to compute the inverse of this LWE trapdoor function can
answer superposition queries and give superpostion outputs, then an efficient quantum attack to
find out the trapdoor exists. However, the oracle in the quantum learnability challenge can be only
interacted with classically; the copy protection program is also defined to have no superposition
output for the underlying function copy-protected. [Reg10] also mentioned the difficulty of finding
a trapdoor when no superposition queries can be made and if the inputs for the inverse function
are required to be valid outputs of the trapdoor function; but no provable hardness is known.
Another option is to investigate trapdoor functions built from other post-quantum primitives
such as code-based cryptography.
Remark 6.6 (Trivial Private Quantum Money Implication). It is easy to see that quantum copy-
protection for any unlearnable functions will imply private-key quantum money: just let the money
issuing authority verify a money state like verifying a pirate program. The testing distribution for
many families of functions must be private(e.g. point functions or evasive functions) and otherwise
important information about the functions protected would leak. But even for balanced functions
with uniform testing distributions that can be public, such as PRF, the verifier still needs to have
the same copy-protection program by itself in order to verify a computation, which makes much less
sense. Therefore, this implication from copy-protection to public-verifiable quantum money is not
easily realizable without the idea of using a trapdoor or a public key/private key pair.
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7 Open Problems
7.1 Discussions of Explicit Copy-Protection Schemes
We have obtained a first provably secure copy-protection scheme based on a classical oracle. How-
ever, this oracle is very strong: it in facts computes the function for us. Therefore, we want to
move forward to remove this too ideal oracle using standard cryptographic assumptions or weaker
oracles, such as random oracle, to build quantum copy-protection.
The [AC12] public key quantum money scheme has been instantiated by [Zha17] assuming
quantum-secure indistinguishabiity obfuscation(iO) and injective one-way functions. Using these
assumptions, we can construct a subspace obfuscator that has the following property: after applying
the subspace obfuscator shO to a subspace A to get shO(A), the original membership checking
functionality is almost not affected, but the adversary cannot distinguish between shO(A) and
shO(B) where A ⊆ B and (|Fn| − |B|) is still exponentially large.
However, Zhandry’s subspace obfuscator is not enough for quantum copy-protection. We need
to show that, given the obfuscated membership program for subspace A and A⊥, the direct-product
problem is still hard for quantum polynomial-time adversaries, a property stronger than the prop-
erty realized by shO. We conjecture that similar techniques may be also applied to construct ob-
fuscators for the membership functions of A and A⊥ such that given the obfuscated programs, any
QPT adversary still needs exponential time to solve the direct-product problem with non-negligible
probability.
Quantum copy-protection is essentially different from quantum money, in that we need to
hide the functionality f in addition to hiding the subspace. Even if we can obtain the subspace
membership obfuscator with the property above, there are quite a few obstacles to building a
provably secure quantum copy-protection scheme. One main obstacle for moving from the oracle
setting to non-black-box setting is that we cannot use the argument about extracting information
from the queries made by pirate programs, since there’s no oracle and therefore we cannot measure
the queries made. On the other hand, we can also consider more specialized constructions in the
cryptographic settings, to copy-protect certain families of functions such as point functions, evasive
functions or PRF, instead of a scheme for general unlearnable functions .
7.2 Related Open Problems
In addition to instantiating the copy-protection scheme, the following questions highly related to
quantum copy-protection are also worth investigation:
• Can we build computationally secure quantum obfuscation(VBB,VGB,diO,iO) for certain
classes of classical circuits?
• Can we build quantum copy-protection/public-key quantum money relative to a (quantum)
random oracle?
• What other quantum cryptography primitives can we construct by applying quantum copy-
protection(either general or for specific functionalities)?
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A Proof for Direct-Product Theorem
In this section, we briefly review the proof for the direct-product lower bound. We restate the
Theorem 4.2 here:
Theorem 4.2 ([BDS16]). Let ǫ > 0 be such that 1/ǫ = o(2n/2). Given one copy of |A〉 and a
subspace membership oracle of A and A⊥, an adversary needs Ω(
√
ǫ2n/4) queries to output a pair
of non-zero vectors (u, v) such that u ∈ A and v ∈ A⊥ with probability at least ǫ.
The main idea is to apply the inner product adversary method (Theorem A.1) from [AC12]:
Theorem A.1 (Inner Product Adversary Method [AC12]). Let S(n) denotes the set of n/2 di-
mensional subspaces in Fn. Let R be a symmetric, anti-reflexive relation on S(n) such that each
subspace in S(n) is related to at least one other subspace. Suppose that initially |〈ψAinit|ψBinit〉| ≥ c
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for all (A,B) ∈ R, whereas at the end we need E(A,B)∈R[|〈ψAf |ψBf 〉|] ≤ d. Then, any algorithm
achieving that must make Ω
(
(c− d)2n/2
)
oracle queries.
This statement is from [BDS16], a slightly stronger adaption from original theorem in [AC12].
This theorem uses the assumption that E(A,B)∈R[|〈ψAf |ψBf 〉|] ≤ d instead of the original assumption
that ∀(A,B) ∈ R, R(A,B) ≤ d. But the original proof is valid for this stronger statement.
A.0.1 Inner Product Adversary Method Overview
The idea of inner product adversary method is to bound how much progress a quantum algorithm
can make at distinguishing two oracles after each query. We denote
∣∣ΨUt 〉 be a quantum algorithm
Q’s state after t queries to the oracle U . We assume that the initial states
∣∣ΨU0 〉 = ∣∣ΨV0 〉, for all
oracles U and V . After the final query T , for all oracle pairs (U, V ) that algorithm Q aims to
distinguish, we must have | 〈ΨUT |ΨVT 〉 | ≤ 1/2. The goal is to show that the inner product can only
decrease by no more than ǫ after a single query, hence Q must make Ω(1/ǫ) queries.
In the proof for quantum money in [AC12], for example, we do not have
∣∣ΨU0 〉 = ∣∣ΨV0 〉 and in fact
the adversary can decrease the inner product | 〈ΨUt |ΨVt 〉 | by a constant amount after making just
one query to U or V respectively. The inner product adversary method is to choose a distribution
D over oracle pairs (U, V ) and analyze how much the expected inner product can decrease after
each query to U and V :
E
(U,V )∼D
[∣∣〈ΨUt ∣∣ΨVt 〉∣∣] . (19)
For two quantum money states |φ〉 and |ψ〉 which satisfy 〈φ|ψ〉 = 12 , in order for the counterfeiter
to perfectly counterfeit, he must map |ψ〉 to |ψ〉⊗2 and |φ〉 to |φ〉⊗2. And he would have to have〈
φ|⊗2|ψ〉⊗2 = (〈φ|ψ〉)2 = 14 so he has to decrease the inner product by 1/4. The idea is to show
that the average inner product can decrease by at most 1/exp(n) after each single query; the
counterfeiter therefore needs to make 2Ω(n) queries.
A.1 Overview of [BDS16]’s Proof for Direct-Product Theorem
Consider the relation R that contains all (A,B) such that dim(A ∩B) = n/2− 1. Then, the inner
product of the initial states 〈A|B〉 = 12 . Let Λ(A) denote all pairs of (u, v) such that u ∈ A\{0} and
v ∈ A⊥\{0}. At the end of computation, if the algorithm can output a pair (u, v) ∈ Λ(A) with high
probability, then the final state is close to |A〉
∣∣A⊥〉. And the inner product 〈A| 〈A⊥∣∣B⊥〉 |B〉 = 14 .
The constant gap implies that the algorithm needs exponential number of queries.
More specifically, they first claim that for a fixed subspace A, if the algorithm can succeed with
constant probability (i.e. 0.99), then it must make Ω(2n/4) oracle queries. They show that the
inner product of the final states can be upper bounded by:
E
(A,B)∈R
[|〈ψAf |ψBf 〉|] ≤ 0.2 + max
A∈S(n),(a,b)∈Λ(A)
Pr
B:(A,B)∈R
[(a, b) ∈ Λ(B)] (20)
≤ 0.2 + 0.25 = 0.45.
where
∣∣∣ψAf 〉 is the final state of the algorithm when the oracle and initial state encodes the subspace
A.
The above claim follows by Theorem A.1. The first half of the inequality is obtained from first
decomposing state
∣∣∣ψAf 〉 and ∣∣∣ψBf 〉 each as two parts, the “succeeded” and the “failed” parts, for
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example
∣∣∣ψAf 〉 = ∑(u,v)∈Λ(A) βAuv ∣∣φAuv〉 |u〉 |v〉 +∑(u,v)/∈Λ(A) βAuv ∣∣φAuv〉 |u〉 |v〉; thus they can rewrite
E(A,B)∈R[|〈ψAf |ψBf 〉|] into several components; next, using simple properties such as that the two
sums form orthogonal vectors and applying Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, linearity of expectation,
etc., one can bound the value by maxA∈S(n),(a,b)∈Λ(A) PrB:(A,B)∈R[(a, b) ∈ Λ(B)].
The second line of the inequality follows from counting subspaces. The probability is over
picking a vector space whose intersection with A has dimension n/2 − 1, which can be done by
picking a random basis for A, discarding one vector in the basis, adding a vector outside A and
using this set of n/2 vectors as a basis for B. We want to know the probability that a ∈ B and
b ∈ B⊥, which means a is in the span of the n/2 − 1 vectors from A and b is orthogonal to the
vector chosen outside A. Then, we can bound both of these two events’ probabilities by 12 and since
they are independent, the total probability is upper bounded by 14 .
Next, they use similar techniques as [AC12] to show that even for exponentially small success
probability ǫ and a random subspace A, the algorithm still needs Ω(
√
ǫ2n/4) queries, which com-
pletes the proof of the theorem. The first part can be proved by fixed point quantum search; the
average-case to worst-case reduction can be proved by applying a random self-reduction: if the ad-
versary can solve the direct-product problem efficiently given a uniformly random state |A〉, he can
solve it given any state |A〉. Given a certain state |A〉 and the oracles UA, UA⊥ , apply a uniformly
random invertible linear map f : Fn → Fn to subspace A. We can compose f with UA and compose
f−T , which is the inverse transpose of f , with UA⊥ to respectively get the oracles for this uniformly
random state |f(A)〉 and its dual subspace state. If we have an efficient adversary for a uniformly
random state, we can just apply f−1 to get a counterfeiter for state |A〉.
B Crytography Primitives and Assumptions
Definition B.1 (One-Way Functions). A family of functions F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ is one-way if
f ∈ F can be computed in (classical) probablistic polynomial time(PPT) and for any non-uniform
PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(n) for all n ∈ N such that:
Pr[A(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≤ negl(n)
Definition B.2 (Trapdoor Functions). A family of functions F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ is family of
trapdoor functions if F is a one-way function family and we can sample f ← F together with a
trapdoor t, so that for any PPT algorithm A:
Pr[A(t, f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] = 1
Definition B.3 (Public-Key Encryption). A (classical) public-key encryption scheme PKE consists
of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
• KeyGen(1n) → (sk, pk) : a randomized algorithm that takes as input a security parameter n ,
and generates a secret and public key pair (sk, pk).
• Enc(m ∈M, pk)→ ct : a randomized algorithm that takes in public key pk and a message m
from message space M, and generates a ciphertext ct.
• Dec(ct, sk)→ m/⊥ : takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext ct, and outputs a message
m or a symbol ⊥ for decryption failure.
A secure PKE scheme should satisfy the following properties:
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Correctness: For any n ∈ N, the following holds for any m ∈ M:
Pr[Dec(sk, ct← Enc(pk,m)) = m] = 1
probability taken over the choice (sk, pk)← KeyGen(1n).
IND-CCA(CCA2) Security: A PKE scheme is secure under (classical) indistinguishability chosen-
ciphertext attack, if for every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(n) such
that for all n ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr
ADec(sk,·)(ct) = b : (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)((m0,m1) ∈ M)← ADec(sk,·)(1n, pk)
b← {0, 1}; ct ← Enc(pk,mb)
 ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n),
where ADec(sk,·) denotes that A has access to the decryption oracle; A can query the oracle
both before and after the challenge phase. Note that A cannot query the decryption oracle on
the encryptions of challenge messages m0,m1.
Definition B.4 (Learning With Errors Problem). An LWEn,m,q,χ instance is as follows. Let Zq
be the additive group modulo a large integer q; A ← Zn×m, s ← Zn, e ← χm where χ is an error
distribution over Zq. Given (A, b = A
⊤s+ e), the search problem is to find s.
The decisional LWEn,m,q,χ is to distinguish between (A, b = A
⊤s+ e) and (A, u) where u
R←− Zq.
Definition B.5 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation). An indistinguishability obfuscator iO for a cir-
cuit class {Cλ} is a PPT uniform algorithm satisfying the following conditions:
• For any C ∈ Cλ, iO(λ,C)(x) = C(x) for all inputs x.
• For all pairs of PPT adversaries (Samp,D), if there exists a negligible function α such that
Pr[∀x,C0(x) = C1(x) : (C0, C1, σ)← Samp(λ)] > 1− α(λ)
then there exists a negligible function β such that
|Pr[D(σ, iO(λ,C0)) = 1]− Pr[D(σ, iO(λ,C1)) = 1]| < β(λ)
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